Belarus’s Lukashenka: “Does anyone really think that the wrong person will accidentally be elected?”

The election was originally scheduled for summer but Alexander Lukashenka’s government decided to bring it forward to January. Political scientists and commentators suggest two explanations. The first is that the winter weather will reduce the likelihood of protests. After the violent repression of the protests that followed the 2020 presidential election, which Lukashenka did not win, the chances of any mass mobilisation for public meetings are slim anyway. But Lukashenka is a dictator in the throes of advanced paranoia, so he prefers to take no chances.

The second explanation is that he wants a renewed mandate in preparation for the upcoming negotiations to end Russia’s war in Ukraine. Lukashenka makes no secret of his wish to take part in the talks. He understands that they will determine Belarus’s status in the post-war reality – and therefore his personal future. Lukashenka sees this election as an attempt to reset and finally close the chapter that was opened by the 2020 elections and accompanying strife, says the respected Belarusian political analyst Artiom Shrajbman in an interview with New.org.pl.

Preparations for the elections can be seen everywhere in Belarus. There are five candidates but hardly anyone cares about four of them, since only one will count. Signing the official petition for the “main candidate” was compulsory, not only in government offices but also in private companies. Lists were drawn up of those who refused to sign their support for Lukashenka.

In parallel, Lukashenka’s regime is sending tantalising signals that could be construed as a thaw or as overtures to the West. One example was the case of Viktor Babaryka, a candidate in the 2020 presidential election, and Maria Kalesnikava, his closest associate. After Babaryka’s arrest, Kalesnikava continued to support [the real winner] Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s campaigning until June 2021. Both are serving long sentences in Belarusian prisons, and for two years there was no contact with them.

There were concerns for their health and even about whether they were alive. In November, the regime allowed Kalesnikava to see her father, who subsequently talked to the media. And in January footage of the imprisoned Babaryka was published by Roman Protasevich, once a co-founder of the opposition media outlet Nexta and today a regime propagandist after he was kidnapped and broken by the Belarusian security services.

In the meantime, Lukashenka has signed several amnesties that have freed dozens of people who were serving shorter political sentences. At a meeting with students, the prosecutor general, Andrej Szwed, claimed that all those suspected of terrorist or extremist (read: political or social) activities have either already been tried or their trials are ongoing. In other words, there is no longer anyone to repress. The comment created a sensation as it seemed to indicate that a period of political terror is ending.

A state of some agitation

That, of course, would be an illusion. The regime in Minsk is not going to give up its repressive methods overnight: they are what keep it hanging on. In preparing for the election, the government has amended the rules on child custody, allowing it to confiscate children from parents who are too politically active. And former political prisoners are getting summonses from the security services to “preventive talks”.

Belarus is in a state of some agitation. There are “unity marches” in the national colours of green and red. Popular pro-regime bloggers and TikTokers staged a flashmob with the slogan “Nado!” (“It’s necessary!”), to echo an utterance of Lukashenka (“If the people say it’s necessary then I’ll stand for president again”). On the independent outlet CityDog.io, Belarusians who live in Belarus (this time round it will not be possible to vote abroad) discussed their feelings about the upcoming poll. This is Angelina from Minsk:

“Elections are advertised at every turn, which is quite amusing given the obvious pointlessness of the event. In recent months, ‘discreet’ propaganda has appeared in my mailbox, i.e. newspapers describing how wonderful our lives are, with the suggestion: ‘Vote to keep it that way’. Frankly I don’t understand why money is being spent on this at all. Does anyone really think that the wrong person will accidentally be elected?”

“Most people have become as indifferent as they possibly can be. Those I know have only discussed the election in terms of whether it makes sense to vote against all the candidates or whether even that ‘legitimises’ what is happening. Personally, I don’t believe that voting in an election in itself legitimises anything, so if someone wants to go and express their opinion, that’s fine. Although I wouldn’t expect it to have any impact.”

“I don’t think anyone expects anything from the election. There is a slight hope that there might be some sort of thaw afterwards, but it’s hard to see that happening.”

And what does Lukashenka have to say about all this? He’s probably afraid, and certainly resentful. During a speech in January, in a visibly diminished voice, he remarked: “Fugitives and others are just waiting for the president to die. They say: ‘He’s about to die, his voice is not the same, he’s talking with difficulty.’ Well, you won’t live to see that.”

What else is going on in Eastern Europe?

Since 1 January there has been no gas and therefore no heating in Transnistria. The breakaway Moldovan region has also experienced power cuts for hours on end. The energy crisis was indirectly triggered by Ukraine’s decision to cancel its contract with Gazprom for the transit of Russian gas at the end of the year. Russia does have alternative supply routes to Transnistria, a rogue dependency that it carved out during the 1992 war. However, it has chosen not to use them, creating a serious humanitarian crisis in the pariah statelet. 

The Kremlin is therefore the orchestrator of the current situation, which it seems to have planned out over several phases. Its ultimate aim is to hurt the pro-European Moldovan government a few months before the country’s parliamentary elections. After all, Moldova, on the other side of the river, has been buying electricity produced in Transnistria from free (sic!) Russian gas. Back in 2022, the government in Chișinau made sure of alternative electricity supplies from Europe, so Moldova is not threatened by a power shortage. The problem is that European electricity is several times more expensive. Moldovans may not appreciate the prospect of further tariff increases. In this way the Kremlin intends to destabilise Moldova and inflame its domestic politics.

Slovakia’s populist government is falling over itself in its overtures to Putin. The to-and-fro of official delegations from Bratislava to Moscow is unceasing, and the rhetoric of the government and the new Slovak president towards Ukraine is becoming increasingly belligerent.

In such moments, the attitude of Simon Omanik, a student who came third in the European Mathematical Olympiad, brings some comfort. Invited to the presidential palace for an awards ceremony, Omanik came with a yellow and blue ribbon on his jacket lapel and refused to shake hands with President Peter Pellegrini. If you haven’t seen it yet, do check out the scene here.