Shorouk Express
The independent Russian newspaper-in-exile Meduza devotes a lengthy article (originally published in Signal, a Russian-language newsletter) to the “people have come of age, and now make up the cohort of young adults who will inherit whatever follows Vladimir Putin in Russia”. This is a group that the press has called “Generation Putin”, which is perhaps inappropriate, given that the Russian leader has been in power since 1999, for a total of 26 years.
Several studies suggest that this generation is increasingly apathetic and depoliticised. “Researchers attribute this to the fact that this generation grew up during a general ‘cleansing’ of the political field by Putin and his allies,” writes sociologist Iskender Yasaveyev. “scholars approach the ‘Putin Generation’ with great caution,” he explains, because “a united youth politics did not immediately emerge when Putin took power in Russia. […] The concept of ‘youth’, including its legal definition, has changed several times under Putin. It origin…ally signified people between 14 and 30 years old, then it was expanded to 35, and in the future the upper limit of “youth” may be raised to 38.”
With the 2011-2013 protests, Russian authorities increased their “patriotic programs” and internet presence, and then with the annexation of Crimea and war in Ukraine in 2014 these programs took on an increasingly militaristic character.
A sociologist at the Levada Center, who requested anonymity, argues that polls do not show support for the government among young Russians: “since 2022, it has become abundantly clear to everyone what can and cannot be said in public,” especially given the severe penalties.
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According to the sociologist, “Russian youth are the most culturally Westernised group in the country. This is mainly because most of them consume foreign pop culture, and this is a trend that aggressively anti-Western domestic policy and state propaganda have failed to curb.” According to studies, young Russians also remain the most tolerant demographic group in the country, despite bans on “gay propaganda” and the move by Russian authorities to label all LGBTQ+ groups as “extremist organisations.”
Over the past 40 years, Russian citizens have almost constantly included men at the front, from Afghanistan (1979-1989) to Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-2009), and, since 2014, on to Ukraine.
Young Ukrainians and the war
“Ukraine: Sacrificed Youth?” is the title of a documentary by war reporter Charles Comiti for the French channel TV station M6 about living and growing up with war. “Since the first days of the conflict, I have been filming these new generations who dream of a free country. And every time I film, it’s the same story: hope, resilience, pain … and anger,” the journalist tells Le Monde. Some of the young people interviewed by Comiti enlist “so that the war can end as soon as possible,” while others try to evade conscription: “I just want to be young,” they say.
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Guardian correspondent Luke Harding in Kyiv writes about those who have simply had enough. “The exact figure is a military secret”, he writes of Ukraine’s deserters, “but officials concede the number is large. They say it is understandable, when tired troops have served for months without a proper break.”
For the Franco-German television channel Arte, Léo Sanmarty reports of more than 15,000 men deserting their posts between January and August 2024, five times the figure for 2022 and twice the figure for 2023. Another report by the station poses the question: “After two years of conflict, Ukrainian society faces a dilemma: How can a country defend itself without restricting the freedom of its citizens?”
The Ukrainian mobilisation model
“Let’s be honest. The problem is big. It’s natural in a situation where you’ve had three years of major war. People are exhausted. They want to see their families. Their children are growing up without them. Relationships get broken. Wives and husbands can’t wait for ever. They feel alone,” Ukraine’s military ombudsman Olha Reshetylova tells Luke Harding. Reshetylova is a human rights activist: she was chosen by President Volodymyr Zelensky for the role last December to enable soldiers to report on violations of their rights, explains The Kyiv Independent.
“We have this post-Soviet heritage where a soldier is slave to his commander. But Ukraine’s army is transforming. We are trying to change it, to make it more modern and human-orientated”, Reshetylova explains. “As I see it, it is Europe’s armies that are absent without leave. They don’t understand – or don’t want to understand – that this is their war too”, she concludes.
To provide a buffer for the situation, the Ukrainian parliament voted to abolish criminal penalties for deserters (12 to 15 years in prison) for those who return to their battalion, with full reinstatement of benefits. A bill was also passed allowing service members to transfer to different units, allowing them to avoid conflicts between lower and higher ranks. Mobilization in Ukraine is now mandatory for men between the ages of 25 and 60.
About 370,000 Ukrainian soldiers have been wounded. Among these, more than 50,000 are amputees.
In Le Grand Continent, French historian Anna Colin Lebedev, who specializes in post-Soviet society, offers a long and interesting analysis of Ukraine’s military mobilisation model as a mirror of society as a whole: “Only 18 percent of respondents in a survey conducted in January 2024 declared mobilisation useless or replaceable. For 82 percent, it is considered necessary by those around them, but only if it is fair.”
“Fairness”, explains Colin Lebedev, means having a demobilisation date (currently this is almost impossible to conceive), and it also involves social justice, meaning the inclusion of all social classes. “However, it would be a mistake to interpret the Ukrainian army’s recruitment difficulties as a sign that society is demotivated, or refuses to resist Russia. Consent to war and consent to take up arms are not equivalent: in the second case, the question of how to take up arms is central. It is about the values of society and the kind of relationship citizens have with their state and their armed forces. Mobilisation for today’s war cannot be done with yesterday’s systems, designed not only for other wars, but for societies that no longer exist. Ukraine gives us an opportunity to reflect on how our own societies would deal with the need to mobilise for war.”
