The paradox of Belarus’ presidential “election”

The upcoming elections are grotesque, even by the authoritarian standards of Alexander Lukashenka’s regime. For the first time in Belarusian history, there is no hint of competition. There are no alternative candidates – only regime loyalists or “spoilers” who openly declare their support for Lukashenka.

In previous elections, only a limited number of opposition figures were allowed to stand, maintaining the illusion of choice. But the trauma of the 2020 protests seems to have convinced Lukashenka to do away with even these superficial gestures. Every aspect of this election will be tightly controlled.

The members of the election commission, largely drawn from pro-government organisations such as the public association Belaya Rus, are an example of the regime’s tight grip. Their identities remain anonymous, and security forces conduct drills to prevent alleged “attacks” near polling stations.

In the run-up to the elections, security forces are holding preventive interviews with former prisoners and activists. Although I cannot reveal the names of those I have spoken to as they are still in Belarus, they have reported that security forces are closely monitoring and intimidating people in the run-up to the elections. Human rights defenders confirm that this intimidation is widespread.

Lukashenka’s strategy has always been based on fear, but the increasing repression underlines the regime’s dependence on force rather than popular support. The only intrigue in these sham elections is how many votes he can claim for himself.

A nation transformed

Belarus today is a far cry from what I witnessed during the historic protests of 2020, when a rigged presidential election sparked months of unprecedented demonstrations. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets each week, defying a brutal crackdown. Protesters have been shot, tortured and imprisoned in large numbers.

As we approach the first presidential election since the mass protests, the mood is grim. Fear has replaced hope. Repression has intensified, although occasional releases of political prisoners appear to be the regime’s attempt to manage the optics. In 2024 alone, the human rights group Viasna documented nearly 9,000 cases of repression, including over 1,700 political criminal charges. Most of these resulted in prison sentences.

I am also in exile, unable to return home. The repression has not stopped, it has only escalated, as I know from personal experience. Last summer, the Minsk court sentenced me and 19 other analysts, journalists and researchers in absentia to 10 and 11 years in prison. We learned of the verdict through reports from the regime, but were not allowed to attend the hearing via video conference. The court refused to release any documents. Although we were assigned lawyers by the regime, they never contacted us for fear of persecution. Much like the election process, the courts have become a facade.

Belarus today is a far cry from what I witnessed during the historic protests of 2020, when a rigged presidential election sparked months of unprecedented demonstrations

As if that were not enough, the regime has also labelled me a “terrorist” and an “extremist”. My X (formerly Twitter) account has been labelled extremist and I am now on the wanted list in Belarus, Russia and all the CIS countries.

For me and the hundreds of thousands of Belarusians who have left the country, it will not be possible to vote abroad at embassies and consulates. According to Ihar Karpenka, head of the Central Election Commission, this is due to a lack of security, a reduction in diplomatic staff and low voter turnout abroad. Instead, Belarusians abroad are being urged to return to Belarus to vote.

However, returning home could result in arrest. On 12 January, security forces arrested a 31-year-old pregnant woman who had recently returned from Lithuania. Her alleged crime? Posting “insulting comments” about the Ministry of Interior five years ago”

This climate of fear makes grassroots activism – let alone protest – almost impossible. State control has only become more suffocating since the 2020 uprising. Arrests continue to be made on a daily basis in Belarus.

In reality, the involvement of the diaspora in the vote could be a major factor in destabilisation, as seen when Moldovans living abroad voted in record numbers in the presidential run-off, securing victory for pro-Western President Maia Sandu.

Why organise elections at all?

For Alexander Lukashenka, elections remain a ritual that he is unwilling to abandon altogether – at least for now. In the summer of 2022, he openly regretted not having cancelled direct presidential elections in Belarus, suggesting instead that they should be modelled on China’s political system.

Domestically, elections serve as a performance to project stability within his regime. As other neighbouring autocracies, such as Russia, continue to hold elections, Lukashenka is motivated to maintain the appearance of popular support in Belarus.

Internationally, Lukashenka wants to maintain the illusion of legitimacy. He hopes that these controlled elections, devoid of protests or unrest, will help him claim that Belarus is turning a political corner, reduce his isolation and minimise global criticism.

Lukashenka’s recent release of 227 political prisoners since the summer of 2024 may appear to be a softening, but these prisoners have long been used as bargaining chips, and this pattern continues.

The regime frames their release as a condition for the lifting of sanctions and aims to improve its international image, particularly with elections on the horizon. However, many prisoners were nearing the end of their sentences and their freedom was conditional, with ongoing surveillance or pressure to cooperate. Prominent figures such as Nobel laureate Ales Bialiatski and activist Maria Kalesnikava remain in prison, with their release dependent on “significant offers” from the West, such as sanctions relief or international recognition.

Expecting a genuine activist to stand or challenge Lukashenka is no longer a realistic possibility

Lukashenka’s attempts to engage with the West may appear insincere, but they are strategic. He seems to anticipate that geopolitical shifts, such as a possible de-escalation in Ukraine or changes in US-Russian relations, could provide opportunities for Belarus to present itself as a stabilising or peace-promoting actor.

Despite his dependence on Moscow, Lukashenka continues to seek greater autonomy. This is evidenced by recent gestures such as the release of some political prisoners and his vocal calls for peace in Ukraine. His discomfort with total dependence on Vladimir Putin stems from both his ambitions and the economic risks associated with an expected slowdown in the Russian economy, which would directly affect Belarus.

Meanwhile, Putin is increasing Belarus’s dependence by offering to station the Oreshnik missile system and Russian nuclear weapons there. This fits into Lukashenka’s narrative of “covering Russia’s back”, but doesn’t mean that Belarus will directly join the war. Hosting these missiles, like the earlier move to deploy nuclear weapons, deepens Belarus’ military and political ties with Russia, further increasing its strategic importance to Moscow.

The strategy of the democratic forces

The exiled democratic forces are concentrating on rejecting the regime’s illegitimate attempts to maintain power. The first step is to refuse to recognise the upcoming elections, calling them fraudulent and a means for the regime to legitimise its dictatorship.

For those who still want to take action, especially those forced to go to the polling stations, citizens are encouraged to mark “against all” on their ballot papers. However, it is difficult to prove how many people voted “against all”, as it is forbidden to take photographs of the ballot papers and the votes are not accurately counted.

Given the difficult situation, this may be the only option for those who want to take action. In last year’s parliamentary elections, Dzmitry Kuchuk, the leader of the now disbanded Green Party, tried to stand but was arrested and sentenced to six years in prison. Expecting a genuine activist to stand or challenge Lukashenka is no longer a realistic possibility.

Countries such as Poland and Lithuania have already publicly stated that they will not recognise the elections because they do not meet the conditions for fairness. The OSCE has also expressed concern that Belarus has refused to allow it to observe the elections, highlighting the regime’s failure to meet international standards.

Releasing political prisoners in Belarus, mobilising people abroad and maintaining links with those inside remain major challenges for democratic forces in exile. The 2022 protests against Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine resulted in thousands of arrests.

Given my “terrorist” status, it is virtually impossible for people inside to communicate openly with me. Nevertheless, I hear about small initiatives aimed at preserving Belarusian culture, history and language. These may not seem like much of a resistance, but they strengthen national identity, which is a strong defence against Russian propaganda. These efforts also provide one of the few opportunities for people to connect and build trust, as the regime tries to project an image of control and widespread support.

🤝 This article is published within the Come Together collaborative project